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Abstract: This paper extends the literature on net marginal tax rates created by the Social Security program by 
including variations in both the probability of being eligible to receive benefits and income-related life expectancy. 
The previous literature has found that women incur a lower net marginal tax rate because they have longer life 
expectancies. The results presented in this paper indicate that including variations in eligibility for benefits partially 
reverses this result by increasing net marginal Social Security tax rates for older women. In addition, the existing 
literature has shown that low-income households pay lower net marginal tax rates because the benefit formula is 
progressive. Including variations in life expectancy reduces, but does not eliminate, this result. This implies that 
differential mortality increases the net marginal Social Security tax rates incurred by low-income households. These 
results are important from a policy standpoint given the gender differences in poverty among the population over 
age sixty-five and the current debate on the future of the Social Security system. 
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I.  Introduction
The comprehensive marginal tax rate is used by economists to assess the distortionary effect
of taxation on labor supply and welfare.  One important component of the marginal tax rate is the
social security payroll tax, which in the United States is assessed on individual wages up to the
annual taxable maximum, which was $76,200 in 2000.  In 2001, approximately 94 percent of all
workers earned less than the annual taxable maximum, thus incurring an Old Age Survivors
Insurance (OASI) social security payroll tax at the margin.
1  For these individuals, social security
is a benefit tax where an extra dollar of earnings may increase their future benefits at retirement.
Therefore, the net marginal social security tax rate (NMSSTR), defined as the difference between
the statutory rate and the present value of the stream of future benefits to which an additional dollar
of earnings entitles the covered worker, should be used in calculating the marginal tax rate for the
purpose of assessing the effect of taxation on labor supply and welfare.
2
   Previous studies that calculated the NMSSTR, including Browning (1985) and Feldstein and
Samwick (1992), find that the system favors women, as they face a lower NMSSTR at each age.
3
 This tax differential is attributed to the longer life expectancies that women enjoy.  Feldstein and
Samwick conclude that this differential is one of the system's most desirable traits because of
empirical evidence that suggests female labor supply is more elastic than male labor supply.
4  Note,
the lower female net tax rate is deemed desirable because it reduces the deadweight loss or welfare
cost associated with taxation.
5
However, these papers ignore a number of factors that determine NMSSTR, with one of the
most important being benefit eligibility.  Previous studies that calculated NMSSTR assumed that
workers are fully insured, that is, are eligible for benefits based on their earnings history.  The2
rationale for such an assumption is that most workers qualify for social security benefits after 10
years of work.  However, older women may have less of an attachment to the labor force, thus their
shorter work histories may not be sufficient to qualify them for benefits based on their own account.
Lingg (1994) estimates that of the 18.4 million women aged 65 and older in 1993, 6.5 million were
entitled to primary benefits, 4.8 million were dually entitled and 7.1 million were entitled to benefits
as a dependent spouse.  Lingg (1994) states that the earnings history for the 7.1 million dependent
spouses failed to qualify them for benefits based on their own account.  In addition, Ferber (1993)
contends that the social security systems future treatment of women will, in part, depend on whether
their earnings histories qualify them for primary benefits.  Therefore, one goal of this paper is to
compare the NMSSTR obtained using social security eligibility requirements to the NMSSTR
obtained under the full insurance assumption to determine if a lower net tax rate persists for older
aged females relative to older aged males.
A second objective of this paper is to account for differential mortality by income group
along with social security eligibility requirements in NMSSTR calculation.  This is important
because the social security benefit formula is generally viewed as progressive, with low-income
individuals afforded proportionately greater benefits.  However, including mortality differences
among income groups may reduce this progressivity.  This will disproportionately affect women,
as Nichols et al.(2001) report that 315,346 women (48.4%) and 80,160 men (10%) retiring in 1999
had earnings histories that would characterize them as low income workers.
6 
The structure of this paper is as follows:  section two describes the procedure used to
determine retiree benefits;  section three describes the calculation of NMSSTR under three
scenarios, scenario one assumes that individuals are fully insured, scenario two incorporates social3
(1)
security eligibility requirements in NMSSTR calculation, and scenario three incorporates differential
mortality and social security eligibility requirements in calculating NMSSTR;  a discussion is
presented in section four, with conclusions contained in section five.
II. Benefit Determination
The social security benefits to which a covered worker is entitled at retirement depends on
lifetime earnings.  Average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) is the measure of lifetime earnings
on which benefits are based.  Earnings are indexed by multiplying the worker's taxable earnings by
an indexing factor for each year after 1950 through the indexing year.  The indexing year is defined
as the second year before a worker attains age 62.  The indexing factor for each year (t) is obtained
by dividing average covered worker earnings in the indexing year (the year an individual attains age
60),  ,by average covered worker earnings at each age (a) in each year, ( ).  AIME for
individuals retiring at the full benefit retirement age, f, is
For individuals attaining age 62 after 1991, AIME is based on the highest 35 years of
earnings.  However, for each year a worker is born before 1929, the number of years, n, in the
computation period is reduced by one.  To convert AIME from an annual to a monthly basis, 1/12
is used.    denotes the indexing factor for each year.   denotes worker earnings in year t.
Finally ,  denotes the number of years between age 60 and the year prior to retirement, 
that a year of unindexed earnings replaces a year of indexed earnings in the benefit formula.4
(2)
Once AIME is determined, the primary insurance amount (PIA), which is the amount of
monthly benefits payable at retirement, may be calculated.  The benefits formula for a covered
worker attaining age 62 in 2000 is
The PIA is composed of two parts: the bend points and the marginal replacement rates.  The bend
points are the dollar amounts defining the AIME bracket in the benefit formula.  The marginal
replacement rate is the applicable percentage used to determine the PIA.
7 
The benefit formula illustrates one fundamental feature of the system: the progressive
structure of social security.  Low-wage workers are afforded proportionately greater benefits with
a marginal replacement rate of 90 percent, in comparison to average-wage and high-wage earners
with marginal replacement rates of 32 and 15 percent, respectively.  Because the social security
benefit formula is structured in a manner that classifies workers into one of three income groups, the
NMSSTR by sex and age are calculated for a representative worker in each of these three income
groups.
III. Calculation of the NMSSTR
Net marginal social security tax rates by sex, age, and income classification are calculated
under three alternative scenarios: the first scenario assumes that individuals are fully insured; the
second scenario incorporates social security eligibility requirements in determining NMSSTR; and
the final scenario accounts for differential mortality by income groups as well as social security
eligibility requirements in calculating NMSSTR. 5
(3)
Full Insurance 
To qualify for social security benefits, an individual must be fully insured.  The measure used
to determine whether a worker is eligible for retirement benefits is quarters of coverage.  Under
current legislation, a worker is fully insured if he obtains one quarter of coverage for each year after
1950 (or age 21, if later) and before the year one dies, becomes disabled or attains age 62.  The
minimum number of quarters required to be fully insured ranges from six to forty.  A worker earned
one quarter of coverage for every $780 earnings in 2000.
8   The maximum number of quarters that
may be earned in any given year is four.
Previous studies that estimate NMSSTR have assumed that workers are fully insured.  The
rationale for such an assumption is that most workers are fully insured after 10 years of work.  Under
this assumption the net marginal social security tax rate is  .    denotes the OASI
statutory rate which is defined as the combined employee-employer legislated rate.  This analysis
assumes that the tax is paid by the employee.
9  The combined employee-employer tax rate was 10.6
percent in 2000.
10   
The present value of the change in anticipated future benefits resulting from a one-dollar
change in earnings is
The future benefits that an additional dollar of earnings entitles an individual at retirement depends
on the marginal replacement rate,  , and the age, a,  at which the individual plans to retire.
Workers are assumed to retire at the normal retirement age, 65.
11  The indexing factor at each age,6
, is estimated assuming that earnings grow at a real rate of one percent.
12  The
probability of an individual of sex s, surviving from age a to age j, is denoted by     is the
age at which all persons are assumed dead and is set at 100 in all calculations.  The rate at which a
worker discounts future benefits, r, is set at 3 percent in all calculations.
13 
To illustrate, consider the case of a female who is 55 years old in 1995 and plans to retire at
age 66 in 2011. Since she will attain age 62 after 1991, AIME is based on the highest 35 years of
earnings.  Earnings through age 60 are indexed to the growth rate in average covered wages.
Assuming real earnings grow at a rate of one percent annually then  An
additional dollar of earnings at age 55 increases average indexed earnings (AIE) by $(1/35)(1.051)=
$0.03.
Assuming that the 55 year old female is a lifetime average earner then her marginal
replacement is 0.32 and an extra dollar of earnings at age 55 would increase PIA by $(0.03)(0.32)
= $0.0096.  The present value of the change in anticipated future benefits resulting from a one-dollar
change in earnings is    The discounted sum of survival probabilities
for a female age 55 is 9.26 and thus  .  Subtracting 0.089 from the statutory rate yields
0.017 or 1.7 percent.
Net marginal social security tax rates for representative low-, average-, and high-income
earners by sex and selected ages in 2000 are shown in Table 1.  The estimates reveal that males and
females at each age face a net marginal social security tax rate that is less than the statutory rate.
Low-wage earners incur the lowest NMSSTR.  Given the progressive nature of the benefit formula,
this is as expected.  Also, the estimates indicate that the NMSSTR declines with age.  The age7
differential is due to higher conditional survival probabilities and because older workers have a
shorter period over which to discount future benefits.  
Across income classes, females face a lower NMSSTR than males at each age.  The
estimated NMSSTR for a low-income female aged 55 is approximately 5.36 percentage points lower
than the rate faced by her male counterpart (-14.42 percent compared to -9.06 percent). Gender
differences in NMSSTR are 1.91 percentage points for average-income individuals and 0.89
percentage points for high-income individuals aged 55.  The gender differential in NMSSTR is
attributable to the longer life expectancy of females.  
Social Security Eligibility Requirements
While most workers qualify for social security benefits after 10 years of work, older women
may have had less of an attachment to the labor force and, as a result, their shorter work histories
may not be sufficient to qualify them for benefits based on their own account.   If this is accurate
then one would expect older males, on average, to have a higher probability of being insured than
older females.  Therefore, gender differences in insurance rates will increase the NMSSTR incurred
by females at each age relative to males.  
Unpublished data furnished by the Social Security Office of the Actuary are used to calculate
insurance rates for individuals by sex and exact age.  The data contained projections covering the
period 2000 by sex and age for the number of fully insured workers as a percentage of the total
population.  Insurance rate probabilities by sex and age are shown in Table 2.  At each age, males
have a higher probability of being insured for social security benefits than females.  This differential8
(4)
is suggestive of the fact that older females have shorter work histories compared to their male
counterparts; as a result, they are less likely to qualify for benefits.
To account for insurance rate requirements in NMSSTR calculation, Equation 3 is rewritten
as follows:
where   denotes the probability that an individual of sex s and age a in year t will be eligible for
benefits at age f in year   ( ).
NMSSTR, by age, sex and income class, which account for social security eligibility are also
shown in Table 2.  As before, NMSSTR at each age are less than the statutory rate, low-income
workers face the lowest tax rates and the tax rates fall with age.
A comparison of the tax rates in Tables 1 and 2 reveals that including insurance probabilities
in determining the actuarial present value of anticipated future benefits has the largest effect on low-
income females.  A low-income female aged 55 faces a net tax rate of 
-9.47 percent, which is 4.95 percentage points higher than the estimate obtained under the
assumption that a low-income female aged 55 was fully insured.  The NMSSTR for a low-income
female aged 65 is -14.71 percent, which is approximately 9.5 percentage points higher than the
estimate obtained under the assumption of full insurance.  The NMSSTR incurred by average-
income and high-income females at each age is higher than the rates obtained under the assumption
that individuals are fully insured.9
These gender differences in NMSSTR indicate that when eligibility is accounted for in
determining net tax rates, older females face a higher NMSSTR than males.  Among low-income
females, the gender differential ranges from 0.18 percentage points at age 62 to 1.5 percentage
points at age 65.  Similarly, males aged 62-65 in both the medium-income and high-income
groupings faced lower NMSSTR than their female counterparts.
Differential Mortality and Social Security Eligibility Requirements.
The progressivity of the social security benefit formula is based on a common mortality
assumption.  However, there is evidence in the literature to suggest that socioeconomic factors such
as weight, eating habits, education and income influence life expectancy.  Indeed, Duleep (1995)
found an inverse relationship between income and mortality among U.S. adults.  Therefore, one
might anticipate low-income worker's shorter life expectancies to offset the progressive nature of
the benefit formula and, thus, increase their NMSSTR.  Given gender differences in mortality, one
would expect that the largest change in tax rates would occur among low-income males.  Life Tables
published by the Social Security Office of the Actuary are used to construct and account for
differences in life expectancy by income in determining NMSSTR.  The method of estimation is
described in Appendix A.
NMSSTR  that account for differential mortality by age, sex, income class, benefit eligibility
are shown in Table 3.  As expected, a comparison of the results in Tables 2 and 3 reveals that low-
income worker’s shorter life expectancy increases their NMSSTR at each age.  A low-income
female aged 55 faces a net tax rate of -5.59 percent, which is 3.88 percentage points higher than the
estimate obtained under the scenario that accounted for social security benefit eligibility.  In10
contrast, including differential mortality reduces the NMSSTR for both average-income and high-
income persons at each age.
IV.  Discussion
One caveat of this research is that the results are based on hypothetical representative
workers, thus the relative importance of various economic assumptions and differences is an
empirical question.  However, this is the best one can do since the real world data are unavailable
(Garrett, 1995).  Notwithstanding, analysis with money flows over several decades is prone to be
very sensitive to the choice of discount rate.  Thus, the results shown in Table 4 for an average wage
worker (PIA to AIME ratio of 0.32) were re-estimated under alternative discount rate assumptions.
14
As shown in Table 4, a lower discount rate reduces NMSSTR at each age.  
In addition, the calculations shown in Tables 1-3 ignore the personal income tax bracket at
which social security retirement benefits will be taxed during retirement.  Thus, the estimates shown
in Table 4 assume that social security benefits will be subject to a federal income tax rate of 15
percent.  For a female aged 55, assuming a discount rate of 3%, taxation of benefits increased her
NMSSTR by 0.57 percentage points (3.69 percent compared to 3.12 percent).
The estimates presented in Tables 1-3 were for single earners.  However, the present value
of anticipated future benefits also depends on whether a beneficiary claims benefits for a dependent
spouse. A dependent spouse is entitled to an additional 50 percent of the primary beneficiaries
benefit amount at retirement. In addition, if the primary beneficiary dies, the dependent is entitled
to 100 percent of the primary beneficiaries benefit.  The formula for calculating the benefits for a
worker, aged a, with a dependent spouse is shown in Appendix B.  Since beneficiaries with a11
dependent spouse do not pay any additional taxes for the additional benefit, they incur a lower
NMSSTR than singles (see Table 4).  The NMSSTR for an average wage male aged 55 with a
dependent spouse, assuming a discount rate of 3 percent, is -0.85 percent, (see Table 4).  This rate
is lower than the rate incurred by female dependent spouses, whose NMSSTR equals the statutory
rate of 10.6 percent.  In effect, female dependent spouses who do not quality for benefits based on
their own account, but pay social security taxes, purchase redundant retirement insurance.
The estimates presented in Tables 1-4 reveal NMSSTR falls with age. The decrease in
NMSSTR with age may lead to intertemporal substitution of labor supply as workers work more in
later years and less in earlier years.  However, whether variation in NMSSTR rates by age are
relevant to worker decisions depends on whether they understand the link between future social
security benefits and current labor supply decisions.  Even if workers are unaware of this link, the
higher rates that older aged females incur relative to males when the probability of insurance was
accounted for is undesirable because it implies a greater excess burden.  This is exacerbated to the
extent that the elasticity of labor supply is greater for female employees than for males (Feldstein
and Samwick,1992).
Although the calculations presented are complex they oversimplify the social security
program in a number of ways.  First, we ignore benefits for dependent children of young widows
or widowers.  Second, we ignore the possibility of divorce and remarriage. Finally, another potential
limitation to our results is that the employer portion of the payroll tax is tax-exempt.  Given the
progressive nature of income taxation this disproportionately benefits higher income individuals.
 Thus, the NMSSTR for high-income individuals may be lower than the estimates reported.  12
V. Conclusion
The analysis reveals how social security tax rules create NMSSTR that treat workers
differently based on age, gender, race, marital status, income, insurance status and life expectancy.
This research contributes to the literature on effective marginal tax rates by accounting for social
security benefit eligibility and income-specific mortality rates in net marginal social security tax
rates calculation.  Including eligibility requirements in the NMSSTR calculation increases the net
tax rate incurred by older aged females.  To reduce the excess burden of taxation would require
reducing marginal tax rates for older aged women.  In addition, the results indicate that differential
mortality by income group reduces the benefits formulas progressivity which, in turn, increases the
net tax rates incurred by low-income primary beneficiaries.  This is important from a policy
standpoint since it may, in part, explain why women aged 65 and older are twice as likely as elderly
men to live in poverty (Levine et al.,1999). 13
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Table 1 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate Estimates for Primary Beneficiaries


















25 0.88 7.15 8.98 -2.61 5.90 8.40
35 -1.50 6.30 8.58 -5.59 4.84 7.90
45 -4.67 5.17 8.06 -9.36 3.50 7.27
55 -9.06 3.61 7.32 -14.42 1.70 6.43
60 -12.26 2.47 6.79 -17.86 0.48 5.86
61 -13.26 2.12 6.62 -18.96 0.09 5.67
62 -14.34 1.73 6.44 -20.12 -0.32 5.48
63 -15.51 1.32 6.25 -21.36 -0.77 5.27
64 -16.78 0.87 6.04 -22.69 -1.24 5.05
65 -18.16 0.37 5.81 -24.12 -1.74 4.81
aWorkers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age.  Low-income workers 
expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.9, average-income and high-income workers 
expect rates of 0.32 and 0.15, respectively.  A real discount rate of 3 percent is assumed. 
The growth rate in real wages is set at 1 percent.16
Table 2
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate Estimates for Primary Beneficiaries
Accounting for Social Security Benefit Eligibility by Sex, 




















25 92.9 1.57 7.39 9.10 89.3 -1.19 6.41 8.63
35 94.7 -0.86 6.53 8.69 91.0 -4.13 5.36 8.14
45 94.0 -3.75 5.50 8.21 90.0 -7.36 4.21 7.61
55 92.6 -7.61 4.13 7.57 80.2 -9.47 3.47 7.26
60 92.2 -10.48 3.11 7.09 75.7 -10.94 2.94 7.01
61 92.4 -11.45 2.76 6.93 75.2 -11.63 2.70 6.90
62 92.6 -12.50 2.39 6.75 74.6 -12.32 2.45 6.78
63 92.8 -13.63 1.99 6.56 74.0 -13.05 2.19 6.66
64 93.0 -14.86 1.55 6.36 73.5 -13.87 1.90 6.52
65 93.2 -16.21 1.07 6.13 72.9 -14.71 1.60 6.38
aWorkers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age.  Low-income workers expect a 
marginal replacement rate of 0.9, average-income and high-income workers expect rates of 0.32
and 0.15, respectively.  A real discount rate of 3 percent is assumed  The growth rate in real 
wages is set at 1 percent.17
Table 3
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate Estimates for Primary Beneficiaries
Accounting for Social Security Benefit Eligibility and Differential Mortality 


















25 4.33 7.15 8.98 1.15 6.20 8.54
35 2.50 6.24 8.55 -1.21 5.10 8.02
45 0.18 5.17 8.05 -3.83 3.90 7.46
55 -3.18 3.78 7.40 -5.59 3.12 7.10
60 -5.99 2.77 6.93 -6.87 2.58 6.84
61 -6.92 2.42 6.77 -7.44 2.33 6.72
62 -7.96 2.05 6.59 -8.03 2.08 6.60
63 -9.10 1.66 6.41 -8.66 1.81 6.48
64 -10.38 1.23 6.21 -9.36 1.51 6.34
65 -11.71 0.75 5.98 -10.22 1.22 6.20
aWorkers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age.  Low-income 
workers expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.9, average-income and high-income 
workers expect rates of 0.32 and 0.15, respectively.  A real discount rate of 3 
percent is assumed.  The growth rate in real wages is set at 1 percent.18
Table 4
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate Estimates for Primary Beneficiaries and Dependents
















Discount rate = 2.2%
25 5.91 4.55 -1.09 10.6
35 5.12 3.61 -1.47 10.6
45 4.29 2.72 -1.79 10.6
55 3.26 2.46 -2.53 10.6
65 0.81 1.15 -4.41 10.6
Discount rate = 3%
25 7.16 6.53 1.38 10.6
35 6.34 5.51 1.15 10.6
45 5.26 4.40 0.40 10.6
55 3.78 3.69 -0.85 10.6
65 0.82 1.92 -3.40 10.6
Discount rate = 3.7%
25 8.13 7.71 3.32 10.6
35 7.33 6.73 2.89 10.6
45 6.21 5.56 1.94 10.6
55 4.60 4.58 0.41 10.6
65 1.40 2.51 -2.61 10.6
aWorkers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age.  Average-income workers expect
a marginal replacement rate of 0.32.  The growth rate in real wages is set at 1 percent.  Estimates 
account for benefit eligibility, differential mortality and taxation of benefits.19
Appendix A
Estimates of the number of survivors,  , by sex,  , and exact age,  are shown in Tables A.1
and A.2. The probability of an individual of sex s, surviving from age a  to age j, is  .
The mortality rate at each age is calculated by subtracting survival probabilities at each age from 1.
To determine mortality rates by income it is initially assumed that 20 percent of the male and
female surviving population aged 20 are low-income workers.  Mortality ratios, that is, the ratio of
one group's death rate to that of the population, are used to split the file table into two tables; one
for low-income and one for both average-income and high-income workers.
15  The mortality ratios
for low-income males and females aged 22,..,64 are 1.73 and 1.15, respectively.  For low-income
males and females aged 65,..,94 the mortality ratios are 1.5 and 1.7 respectively.
16   The mortality
ratio for low-income workers is  , where  and  denotes mortality rates for the total
population and low-income workers, respectively.  Solving the mortality rate for the low-income
individuals is straightforward, with  .  
Mortality rates by sex and age for low-income persons are subtracted from 1 and multiplied
by the number of low-income persons that survived to age a-1 to estimate the number of low-income
persons by sex, surviving to age a. The number of average/high-income persons of sex s surviving
to age a is estimated by subtracting the number of low-income survivors from the total number of
survivors.  The number of survivors at each age in their respective income classes is then used to
calculate the probability that a person aged a will survive to age j. For each income class the survival
probabilities are in turn used to calculate . 20
Table A.1
Life Tables Used in NMSSTR Estimation, Females














25  98671 19727 78944  63  88487 17403 71084 
26  98616 19714 78902  64  87504 17181 70323 
27  98560 19701 78859  65  86431 16823 69608 
28  98499 19687 78812  66  85262 16436 68826 
29  98434 19672 78762  67  83995 16021 67974 
30  98362 19656 78706  68  82633 15579 67054 
31  98283 19638 78645  69  81183 15114 66069 
32  98198 19618 78580  70  79649 14629 65020 
33  98106 19597 78509  71  78022 14121 63901 
34  98011 19575 78436  72  76296 13590 62706 
35  97913 19553 78360  73  74470 13037 61433 
36  97812 19529 78283  74  72546 12464 60082 
37  97706 19505 78201  75  70520 11872 58648 
38  97597 19480 78117  76  68381 11260 57121 
39  97484 19454 78030  77  66118 10627 55491 
40  97365 19427 77938  78  63731  9975  53756 
41  97241 19398 77843  79  61223  9307  51916 
42  97110 19368 77742  80  58593  8628  49965 
43  96971 19336 77635  81  55833  7937  47896 
44  96821 19302 77519  82  52932  7236  45696 
45  96659 19265 77394  83  49894  6530  43364 
46  96484 19225 77259  84  46723  5824  40899 
47  96293 19181 77112  85  43430  5126  38304 
48  96083 19133 76950  86  40032  4445  35587 
49  95849 19079 76770  87  36550  3787  32763 
50  95589 19020 76569  88  33015  3165  29850 
51  95298 18953 76345  89  29465  2586  26879 
52  94974 18879 76095  90  25946  2061  23885 
53  94617 18797 75820  91  22510  1597  20913 
54  94225 18708 75517  92  19211  1199  18012 
55  93797 18610 75187  93  16103  869  15234 
56  93330 18504 74826  94  13234  606  12628 
57  92819 18387 74432  95  10645  404  10241 
58  92257 18259 73998  96  8374  258  8116 
59  91638 18118 73520  97  6440  157  6283 
60  90957 17963 72994  98  4841  90  4751 
61  90207 17793 72414  99  3557  50  3507 
62  89386 17607 71779  100  2558  26  2532 
aThis refers to the number of females by income classification reaching exact age a during the year in the stationary
population.  Estimates were constructed from life tables published by the Social Security Office of the Actuary.21
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25 97672  19430  78242 63  78893 13414 65479
26 97498  19370  78128 64  77494 13002 64492
27 97313  19306  78007 65  75968 12618 63350
28 97117  19239  77878 66 74303  12203  62100 
29 96910  19168  77742 67 72499  11759  60740 
30 96692  19093  77599 68 70565  11289  59276 
31 96462  19015  77447 69 68515  10797  57718 
32 96220  18932  77288 70 66356  10286  56070 
33 95967  18846  77121 71 64088  9759  54329 
34 95704  18757  76947 72 61703  9214  52489 
35 95432  18665  76767 73 59195  8652  50543 
36 95152  18570  76582 74 56559  8074  48485 
37 94862  18472  76390 75 53795  7483  46312 
38 94561  18371  76190 76 50909  6880  44029 
39 94244  18264  75980 77 47917  6274  41643 
40 93909  18152  75757 78 44838  5669  39169 
41 93552  18032  75520 79 41699  5074  36625 
42 93174  17906  75268 80 38522  4494  34028 
43 92783  17776  75007 81 35331  3936  31395 
44 92391  17646  74745 82 32149  3404  28745 
45 92004  17518  74486 83 29003  2904  26099 
46 91623  17393  74230 84 25923  2442  23481 
47 91242  17268  73974 85 22937  2020  20917 
48 90849  17139  73710 86 20074  1642  18432 
49 90427  17001  73426 87 17364  1309  16055 
50 89964  16851  73113 88 14830  1023  13807 
51 89454  16686  72768 89 12495  781  11714 
52 88895  16505  72390 90 10375  582 9793 
53 88287  16310  71977 91  8480 423 8057 
54 87630  16100  71530 92  6816 298 6518 
55 86923  15875  71048 93  5382 204 5178 
56 86161  15634  70527 94  4169 135 4034 
57 85335  15375  69960 95  3164  86 3078 
58 84444  15097  69347 96  2352  53 2299 
59 83488 14802 68686 97  1711 31 1680 
60 82461 14487 67974 98  1218 18 1200 
61 81361 14152 67209 99  848  10  838 
62 80176 13796 66380 100  577  5  572 
aThis refers to the number of males by income classification reaching exact age a during the year in the 
stationary population.  Estimates were constructed from life tables published by the Social Security 
Office of the Actuary. 22
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Appendix B
The formula, obtained from Feldstein and Samwick (1992), for calculating the present value
of the change in anticipated future benefits resulting from a one-dollar change in earnings for a male
worker, aged a, with a dependent spouse is as follows:
where,
m = male, f=female and dependent souses are assumed to be the same age as their husband.
The definitions of the other characters are identical to those defined in the text. 
The first term of Equation A.1 denotes the expected value of widows benefits conditional
on the worker dying at age a.  The second term denotes the expected value of the man’s retirement
benefit conditional on him attaining his full benefit retirement age, f.  The third term denotes the
expected value of the dependent spouse’s benefit conditional on both parties reaching the full benefit
retirement age.  25 
1. http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/fast_facts/2002/ff2002.html (Verified December 5, 2002).
2.  While many of the researchers recognize the link between the payroll tax paid on an additional dollar of
earnings and anticipated future benefits, their analysis typically calculates the comprehensive marginal tax rate
using the social security statutory rate and as a consequence their results are overstated.
3.  Also, Burkhuaser and Turner (1985) recognize that the net payroll tax levied on an additional dollar of earnings
is not constant across workers but depends on a number of factors including one's current age, planned retirement
age, martial status and life expectancy. 
4. Killingsworth (1983) reviews the empirical results from a number of labor supply studies and finds evidence that
supports this theory
5.  Browning (1975) was among the first to recognize that the social security system's social adequacy objective
resulted in significant welfare costs.  Hausman (1981) analyzed the allocative effects of taxation and found that a
10 percent tax cut would increase a wife's labor supply by 52 hours per year and reduce the excess burden of
taxation by 10.6 percent.  Similarly, he found that a 10 percent tax cut would increase the husband's labor supply
by 22.5 hours per year and lead to a significant reduction in deadweight loss. 
6.The numbers of men (80,160) and women (315,136) classified as low income workers were estimated by
combining the Nichols et al. (2001) percentages with information on the number of persons initially awarded retiree
benefits by age and gender in 1999 as shown in Table 6.B1 of the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security
Bulletin (2000)
7.  The 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act indexed the benefit formula's bend points to the growth rate in
average covered wages.  The marginal replacement rates were fixed at 90, 32 and 15 percent, respectively. 
8.  The dollar amount of earnings required to attain one quarter of coverage has changed with amendments to the
Social Security Act.  Following the 1977 amendments, the dollar amount defining one quarter of coverage was indexed
to the growth rate in average covered wages.
9.  Britain (1972) found that the payroll tax reduced employee wages by the full amount of the tax.
10.  The tax rate ignores the disability insurance (DI) and health insurance (HI) contribution rates.  Including both
rates increases the net marginal social security tax rate by the statutory amount.  In 2000, the combined employee-
employer DI and HI rates were 1.8 and 2.9 percent, respectively.
11. The formula in Equation 3 estimates the actuarial present value of anticipated future benefits relative to some
benchmark retirement age.  The age chosen here, f, is defined as the full benefit retirement age.  This corresponds
to the age at which an individual is first eligible for retirement benefits without actuarial adjustment.  Following
legislation implemented in the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act, the full benefit retirement age,
currently 65, is scheduled to increase 2 months each year beginning in the year 2000.  Between 2005 and 2016 the
full benefit retirement age will remain at 66.  In 2017, the full benefit retirement age is scheduled to increase 2
months per annum and will be fixed at age 67 for those attaining age 62 after the year 2022.  The retirement age
for workers with a full benefit retirement age in terms of years and months is rounded to the next full year in all
calculations. 
12. The economic assumptions used in the calculations are based on the 2000 Social Security Board of Trustees
best cost estimates.
Endnotes25 
13. A rate of 3 percent was chosen to approximate an individual's rate of time preference.  As before, this rate
chosen was based on recommendations contained in the 2000 Trustees Report.
14. The discount rates chosen were 3.7 percent and 2.2 percent and were based on the 2001 Social Security Board
of Trustees low- and high-cost economic assumptions.
15. A mortality ratio greater than one indicates that the number of deaths in a cohort exceeds the number of deaths
one would anticipate solely on the basis of sex and age.
16. The rate for low-income males aged 22,..,65 was constructed by Duleep (1989).  The other rates were
constructed by Kitagawa and Hauser (1973).